In September 1981, the US delegation to the agency’s General Conference (GC) was instructed to anticipate a “severe attack” against Israel, and to “vigorously” object to a vote on the “suspension of technical aid” to Israel. Israel publicly criticized the agency for its shortcomings in Iraq, while agency officials staged their own counter campaign.
The diplomatic battle spilled over into the IAEA. According to this strategy, Washington would harshly condemn Israel but would “draw the line on punishment.” Weinberger adhered to his support of a punitive response, voicing his criticism of the Israeli leadership in other unrelated instances in the months to come. On the other hand, a key, pro-Israeli voice belonged to ACDA Director-Designate Eugene Rostow, who stated that Israel should be given an exemption from the NPT given the dangers of the region.Ī few days into the crisis, Haig proposed a new strategy to deal with the raid. Within the administration, NSC staffers supported the softest line, stopping short of supporting of the raid. Realizing that the raid should have been at least somewhat anticipated, the administration now chose to adopt a milder approach. In a diplomatic cable, Lewis explained that the Carter administration had clear indications from Israel on its intention to launch a strike. Allen informed Reagan that the administration was in fact “not required to make a legal determination on whether Israel violated US law,” stating the issue should be treated “as a political rather than a legal question.” Indian diplomats speculated that the suspension was perhaps an American goodwill gesture towards Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, designed to appease him and keep the peace process with him alive.Īdministration officials were gradually becoming aware of a “gap” in the administration’s “institutional memory,” as termed by US ambassador to Israel, Sam Lewis. Israeli ambassador to Washington, Ephraim Evron, informed Reagan that Israel was surprised and concerned by the unexpected suspension.Ī week after the raid, the US attitude started to change. The administration suspended the delivery of additional jets, pending a legal review of the strike. The raid was carried out by American F-16 jets and Israel was legally required not to use them to attack its neighbors, unless as an act of “legitimate self-defense. Secretary of State Alexander Haig told the Israelis that the raid caused a serious complication for the US, stating, “President Reagan thinks the same.” The Israelis learned from Haig and from another source that Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger was promoting a tough, anti-Israel response. When the raid took place, it caught the administration by surprise, leading to an initially harsh reaction towards Israel. The paper crowned the administration’s nonproliferation efforts as a “key foreign policy objective” and called to revise the existing Carter era legislation, the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA). On 7 June 1981, the day of the raid, a policy paper composed by the ‘Senior Interagency Group on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Cooperation’ (SIG) was submitted to the NSC. His Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) transition team called for a clean, dramatic break from the policies of the outgoing Carter administration on nuclear proliferation. When Reagan won the November 1980 presidential elections, Iraq’s nuclear program was not on his agenda. In July 1979, US diplomats told their Italian counterparts that it was an “American strong belief” that Iraq was pursuing a nuclear capability. Iraq’s nuclear program made critical progress in 19, with the assistance of nuclear technology imported from France and Italy. We address these questions by exploring declassified documents from numerous archives in a forthcoming article in the Journal of Cold War Studies. The raid has received much attention in academic and political circles, especially in the context of the Iranian nuclear program, yet significantly, some important questions on Washington’s reaction to the raid and its impact on Reagan’s nonproliferation policy were left unanswered.
On 7 June 1981, the Israeli Air Force launched a strike against the Iraqi nuclear reactor Osirak, marking it as the first successful raid conducted against a ‘hostile’ nuclear reactor.
Careers, Fellowships, and Internships Open/Close.Wahba Institute for Strategic Competition.Science and Technology Innovation Program.Refugee and Forced Displacement Initiative.The Middle East and North Africa Workforce Development Initiative.Kissinger Institute on China and the United States.Nuclear Proliferation International History Project.North Korea International Documentation Project.Environmental Change and Security Program.Hyundai Motor-Korea Foundation Center for Korean History and Public Policy.
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